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 Since the first QKD protocol (BB84) [1] was proposed in 1984, great progress have been 
made in QKD experiments [5-18]. A major step in QKD is transmitting quantum signals 
between Alice and Bob. Because of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, an eavesdropper’s 
intervention with the quantum signals transmitted between two users inevitably disturbs the 
quantum signals. Therefore, all existing QKD protocols must monitor the signal disturbance 
to place a bound on the potential information leakage [3]. However, T. Sasaki et al. 
proposed a quite different protocol [4], named round-robin differential phase shift (RRDPS), 
in which the amount of eavesdropped information is bounded without monitoring the signal 
disturbance. Here, we present the first active implementation of the RRDPS protocol.  
Before proceeding to our experiment, it is beneficial to introduce the workflow of the 
RRDPS protocol and explain why this protocol is quite different from the previous QKD 
protocols. For simplicity, we first consider the case in which Alice is equipped with a 
perfect single-photon source. The workflow is as follows: (I) Alice generates an L-bit 
random sequence 𝑠1𝑠2. . . 𝑠𝐿 ∈ {0,1}
⊗𝐿 and encodes her single-photon quantum signal as a 
superposition of time bins: 
 |Ψ⟩ =
1
√𝐿
∑(
𝐿
𝑘=1
− 1)𝑠𝑘|𝑘⟩, (1) 
in which |𝑘⟩ (1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝐿) represents the case in which the single photon is in the 𝑘𝑡ℎ time-
bin. (II) With a variable-delay interferometer, Bob randomly sets the pulse delay value (1 ≤
𝑟 ≤ 𝐿 − 1) and attempts to observe the relative phase between |𝑘⟩ and |𝑘 + 𝑟⟩ (𝑘 + 𝑟 ≤ 𝐿). 
If the relative phase between |𝑘⟩  and |𝑘 + 𝑟⟩  is obtained, the value of 𝑘  and 𝑟  will be 
declared to Alice via an authenticated public channel. Meanwhile Bob records his sifted key 
bit as 0 (1) if the corresponding relative phase is 0 (𝜋). (III) Alice computes 𝑠 = 𝑠𝑘 ⊕ 𝑠𝑘+𝑟 
as her sifted key bit, where ⊕ denotes summation modulo 2. (IV) Repeating steps (I)−(III), 
Alice and Bob can accumulate sufficient sifted key bits. Then, the final secure key bits can 
be generated via error correction and privacy amplification. Intuitively, there is only one 
photon, and the delay value 𝑟 is unknown to Eve before sifting; thus, the chance that Eve 
can learn the phase difference between |𝑘⟩ and |𝑘 + 𝑟⟩ is small when 𝐿 is large. The larger 𝐿 
is, the smaller the chance of eavesdropping is. In Ref. [4], it is proved that Eve’s 
information about the sifted key bits is bounded by ℎ(1/(𝐿 − 1)) , where ℎ(𝑥) =
−𝑥𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑥 − (1 − 𝑥)𝑙𝑜𝑔2(1 − 𝑥) is the Shannon entropy function. Here, it is clear that Eve’s 
information is estimated without using the bit error rate; thus, monitoring of the signal 
 disturbance is not necessary for privacy amplification. The physics behind the security 
mechanism is information causality [19], which forbids Eve from learning key bits.  
The above arguments represent an ideal model only in theory because the assumed single-
photon source is not available at present. In real-life situations, Alice must prepare packets 
of L weak coherent pulses instead of single-photon pulses. Assuming that the average 
photon number per pulse is 𝜇, the probability that there are more than 𝜈𝑡ℎ photons in one 
packet is given by  
 𝑒𝑠𝑟𝑐 ≜ 𝑃𝑟(𝑣 ≥ 𝜈𝑡ℎ) = 1 − ∑
𝑒−𝐿𝜇(𝐿𝜇)𝑛
𝑛!
𝜈𝑡ℎ
𝑛=0
， (2) 
where, 𝑣   represents the photon number in this packet. When the global phase of each 
packet is randomized, the final asymptotic secret key rate per packet can be given by [4] 
 𝑅 = 𝑄(1 − 𝑓ℎ(𝑒𝑏)) − 𝑒𝑠𝑟𝑐 − (𝑄 − 𝑒𝑠𝑟𝑐)ℎ(
𝜈𝑡ℎ
𝐿 − 1
), (3) 
in which 𝑓 is the efficiency of error correction, 𝑄 is the yield per packet, and 𝑒𝑏 represents 
the error rate of the sifted key bits. For a set of given experimental parameters 𝐿, 𝜇, 𝑄 and 
𝑒𝑏, one should optimize 𝜈𝑡ℎ to maximize the secret key bit rate 𝑅.  
For the finite-sized sifted key case with a failure probability 3 × 2−𝑠, the secret key rate 
can be corrected as follows [4]: 
 𝑅𝑓𝑡 = [𝑁(1 − 𝑓ℎ(𝑒𝑏)) − 𝑁𝑟1 − 𝑁(1 − 𝑟1)ℎ(𝑟2) − 𝑠]/𝑁𝑒𝑚, (4) 
where 𝑁𝑒𝑚 is the number of emitted packets, 𝑁 is the corresponding length of the sifted key 
bits, 𝑟1 = 𝑝1 + √(2𝑙𝑛2)𝑝1(1 − 𝑝1)𝑠/𝑁, 𝑟2 = 𝑝2 + √(2𝑙𝑛2)𝑝2(1 − 𝑝2)𝑠/(𝑁(1 − 𝑟1)), and 
𝑝1 = 𝑒𝑠𝑟𝑐𝑁𝑒𝑚/𝑁, and 𝑝2 = 𝜈𝑡ℎ/(𝐿 − 1).  
From (3) and (4), it is quite clear that the larger 𝐿 is, the higher the secret key rate we 
obtain. When 𝐿 is sufficiently large, RRDPS may outperform the existing protocols, such as 
BB84. However, it is not easy to implement the RRDPS protocol with large 𝐿. The main 
difficulty lies in implementing a variable-delay interferometer with high visibility and good 
stability. To overcome this challenge, we propose four typical schemes to implement such a 
variable-delay interferometer (for three of the schemes, see the Methods for details), and we 
use the optimal Faraday-Michelson scheme to experimentally realize RRDPS QKD with 
𝐿 = 65.  
The experimental setup is summarized in Fig. 1. At Alice’s site, a continuous wave (CW) 
 laser, whose central wavelength is 1550.12 nm, is first modulated into a pulse train by the 
subsequent intensity modulator (IM1). The pulse in the train has a temporal width of 96 ps 
and a repetition rate of 1 GHz. Next, the second intensity modulator (IM2) chops this pulse 
train into packets of 65 pulses. By randomly modulating {−
𝜋
2
,
𝜋
2
} on each pulse, the key data 
are encoded on the packet using the first phase modulator ( PM1 ). The second phase 
modulator (PM2) is added to randomize the global phase of each packet [20]. Additionally, 
the following variable attenuator (VA) attenuates the average photon number per pulse to 
the optimal value, which is obtained from numerical simulations (see Methods for details). 
These coded packets are then transmitted to Bob via a standard telecom fiber channel. At 
Bob’s site, a three-port circulator (CIR) is set before his 1-GHz, 1-64-bit variable-delay 
Faraday-Michelson interferometer (FMI), which makes the 𝑘𝑡ℎ  pulse interfere with the 
(𝑘 + 𝑟)𝑡ℎ pulse in the same packet; here, 𝑟 is the current delay of the interferometer, which 
ranges from 1 to 64. The two outputs of the FMI are connected to a double-channel single-
photon detector (SPD). Both the sync signals and outputs of the SPD are sent to the time-to-
digital convertor (TDC). Once the TDC records a click event in the interference area, Bob 
and Alice can share one sifted key bit. 
 
FIG. 1. Experimental setup of the RRDPS QKD system. Using IM𝟏 and  IM𝟐, Alice prepares packets that are 
composed of a train of 65 pulses separated by intervals of 1 ns. These pulses are encoded with a randomly 
modulated phase {−
𝝅
𝟐
,
𝝅
𝟐
}. PM𝟐 is added to randomize the global phase of each packet. Bob uses a 1-GHz, 1-64-bit 
variable-delay interferometer and a double-channel SPD to observe the relative phase between the 𝒌th and (𝒌 +
𝒓)th pulses, where 𝒓 is the random delay of the variable-delay interferometer that Bob sets for the received packet, 
𝟏 ≤ 𝒓 ≤ 𝟔𝟒, and 𝟏 ≤ 𝒌 ≤ 𝟔𝟓 − 𝒓. The variable-delay interferometer is based on the structure of the FMI, which 
is insensitive to polarization variation. Once the delay 𝒓 = 𝒙 − 𝒚 is set by controlling two 𝟏 × 𝟖 OSs, the 
interferometer has a long arm with delay 𝒙 ∈ {𝟖, 𝟏𝟔, 𝟐𝟒, 𝟑𝟐, 𝟒𝟎, 𝟒𝟖, 𝟓𝟔, 𝟔𝟒} and a short arm with delay 𝒚 ∈
 {𝟎, 𝟏, 𝟐, 𝟑, 𝟒, 𝟓, 𝟔, 𝟕}. In each delay, a PZT cylinder wrapped with an optical fiber is utilized to obtain better 
precision and to compensate for the phase shift. The gated double-channel SPD is based on InGaAs avalanche 
photodiodes and uses the sine-wave filtering method. The maximum transmission distance of the fiber channel in 
the experiment is 90 km.
The variable-delay interferometer is the core part of Bob’s setup. Here, we use the FMI 
[21] as the basic structure. One FMI is composed of one 50/50 beam splitter (BS) and two 
Faraday mirrors (FMs), which make the interferometer insensitive to polarization variation. 
The stability of this fixed-delay FMI has been demonstrated in several previous QKD 
experiments [7,8,16,21,22]. To realize the variable-delay interferometer, each of the two 
arms of the conventional FMI were replaced with one 1 × 8 optical switch (OS) and eight 
FMs with different fiber delays. Each 1 × 8 OS is composed of seven NanoSpeed 1 × 2 
OSs (from Agiltron Inc.).  The arm with the {0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7} delays is called the short arm, 
whereas that with {8,16,24,32,40,48,56,64} delays is called the long arm. One 1 × 8 OS 
independently chooses the 𝑥 delay in the long arm, and the other 1 × 8 OS chooses the 𝑦 
delay in the short arm. Once the 𝑥  and 𝑦  delays are decided, the total delay of the 
interferometer is 𝑥 − 𝑦 = 𝑟. In total, there are 64 combinations of 𝑥 and 𝑦 delays. See Fig. 
2a for the design that transforms the interferometer into a 1-GHz, 1-64-bit variable-delay 
interferometer. 
One of the main challenges for realizing this variable-delay interferometer is to obtain 
each delay with high precision. In conventional DPS QKD experiments, the repetition rate 
of the pulse train can be finely tuned to match the fixed-delay interferometer because there 
is only one delay value. In contrast, in the variable-delay interferometer, there are too many 
delays to match. In this 1-GHz, 1-64-bit variable-delay FMI, the final precision of each 
delay is only approximately 10 μm, despite significant efforts made to improve the precision. 
Furthermore, a piezoelectric transducer (PZT) cylinder wrapped with an optical fiber was 
utilized to obtain better precision. Each delay in the long and short arms has one PZT 
cylinder whose stretching coefficient is approximately 0.08 μm/(V ∙ m), and the length of 
the optical fiber that is wrapped around the cylinder is approximately 2 meters. In addition, 
the phase shift in each delay was compensated by carefully adjusting the voltage on each 
PZT cylinder.  
The average insertion loss (IL) of the 1-GHz, 1-64-bit variable-delay interferometer is 
5.60 dB. Compared with our previous fixed-delay interferometer, the increment of IL 
mainly comes from the round-trip IL of three 1 × 2 OSs. Each IL value of 64 delays is 
 shown in Fig. 2b. The maximum IL in the long arm is at 𝑥 = 48, and that in the short arm is 
at 𝑦 = 2; thus, the maximum IL of the variable-delay interferometer, 6.04 dB, occurs at a 
delay value of 46. Similarly, the minimum IL, 5.30 dB, occurs at a delay value of 5 (𝒙 =
𝟖, 𝒚 = 𝟑). In the worst case, the discrepancy between the long arm and short arm is only 
approximately 0.37 dB, which has a very small impact on the visibility.  
 
FIG. 2. Parameters of each delay of the variable interferometer. a. 64 variable delays of the interferometer, 
corresponding to 64 combinations (𝒙 − 𝒚) of the delay 𝒙 of the long arm and the delay 𝒚 of the short arm. For 
the 1-GHz, 1-64-bit variable-delay interferometer in our experiment, the dimensions of 𝒙, 𝒚, and 𝒙 − 𝒚 are ns. b. 
IL of 64 delays of the variable interferometer. The average IL of the variable-delay interferometer is 5.60 dB. The 
maximum IL, 6.04 dB, occurs at a delay value of 46 (𝒙 = 𝟒𝟖, 𝒚 = 𝟐), and the minimum IL, 5.30 dB, occurs at a 
delay value of 5 (𝒙 = 𝟖, 𝒚 = 𝟑). c. Error rate of 64 delays. The average error rate is approximately 2.20% and was 
measured in the case in which the average photon number per pulse was 0.1 and transmission distance was 0 km. 
Each value of 64 delays was sorted out. The maximum value, 2.41%, occurred at a delay of 43 (𝒙 = 𝟒𝟖, 𝒚 = 𝟓). 
The variance of these 64 error rates is approximately 0.011%. 
The high precision of each delay, the good balance between the two arms, and the low 
insertion loss of the OS enable our variable interferometer scheme to exhibit very high 
scalability. Although the implemented variable interferometer is 1 GHz and 1-64 bits, we 
could expand it to 1 GHz and 1-1024 bits by using two 1 × 32 OSs. However, the change in 
the IL of the interferometer is only one round-trip IL per two 1 × 2  OSs, which is 
approximately 2.4 dB. Compared with three other feasible schemes (see Methods for 
details), the implemented Faraday-Michelson variable interferometer exhibits optimal 
performance. Compared with the passive scheme, the implemented variable interferometer 
only needs two detectors. Compared with the simple active scheme, the implemented 
variable interferometer has better IL balance between the two arms. Compared with the 
balanced active scheme based on the Mach-Zehnder interferometer structure, the 
 implemented variable interferometer has almost the same IL but better stability. These 
advantages help the implemented variable interferometer obtain high visibility and good 
stability.  
The photons from the variable-delay interferometer were detected by the gated SPD, 
which is based on InGaAs avalanche photodiodes and uses the sine-wave filtering method 
[23]. Two channels of this SPD were controlled independently to achieve approximately the 
same performance. The first channel was operated at a temperature of −35℃ with 20.23% 
detection efficiency and 0.85 × 10−6 dark counts per gate; the second channel was operated 
at a temperature of −50℃ with 20.36% detection efficiency and 1.25 × 10−6 dark counts 
per gate. The gate durations of the first and second channels were 154 and 178 ps, 
respectively, and the inherent dead time of both channels was 120 ns, which resulted in no 
more than one count during the detection of one packet. Except for dark counts, the 
afterpulse probability of SPD also contributes to the error rate of the system, and this 
contribution is independent of the fiber distance [24]. We developed one technique to 
effectively decrease the afterpulse probability and achieved afterpulse probability values of 
1.25% and 0.95% for the two channels.  
To estimate the error rate due to optical misalignments and the afterpulse effect, we set 
the average photon number per pulse to 0.1 and transmission distance to 0 km and then 
measured the average probability with which an erroneous detector clicked. The results for 
all 64 delays were sorted out, as shown in Fig. 2c. The average error rate is approximately 
2.20%. The maximum value is 2.41% at a delay of 43 (𝒙 = 𝟒𝟖, 𝒚 = 𝟓). The variance of these 
64 error rates is approximately 0.011%.  
Based on the above specific experimental parameters, the performance of our RRDPS 
QKD system was estimated, and the secret key rate was maximized by choosing the optimal 
average photon number per pulse 𝜇 for each fiber length (see Methods for details). The 
corresponding error rates and secret key rates were simulated after obtaining the optimal 𝜇 
values. The simulation results regarding the secret key rate, error rate, and optimal 𝜇 are 
denoted by the solid lines in Figs. 3a, b, and c, respectively. Setting the real-life average 
photon number per pulse close to the optimal one, we measured the yield per packet Q and 
the bit error rate 𝑒𝑏 and then calculated the secret key rates R (using Eq.(3)) and 𝑅𝑓𝑡 (using 
Eq. (4)) for six different fiber lengths: 20, 50, 70, 80, 85, and 90 km. The experimental 
results are denoted by the circles and triangles in Fig. 3. In Fig. 3a, the circles represent the 
 key rate per pulse for the asymptotic case, and the triangles are for the finite-key size case, 
in which the security parameter is 𝟑 × 𝟐−𝟖𝟎  and the number of packet emitted  𝑵𝒆𝒎 =
𝟐 × 𝟏𝟎𝟖. Even at a transmission distance of 80 km, 𝑅𝑓𝑡 is approximately 76% of R, which 
exhibits better tolerance of the finite-sized-key effect of RRDPS QKD. From Fig. 3a, it is 
clear that the secret key bits can be distributed over a 90-km transmission distance. From 
Fig. 3b, the increase in the error rate primarily comes from the contribution of the dark 
counts of the SPD. If a superconducting nanowire SPD (e.g., ID280 from ID Quantique) 
were used, then the secure transmission distance would increase substantially (e.g., 160 km 
using ID280).  
 
FIG. 3. Numerical simulation and experimental results. The solid curve indicates the simulation results, and the 
circles denote the experimental results for transmission distances of 20, 50, 70, 80, 85, and 90 km. a. Secret key rate 
(per pulse) v.s. transmission distance. The circles are for the asymptotic situation; the triangles are for the finite-key-
size case, in which the security parameter was 𝟑 × 𝟐−𝟖𝟎 and the number of packets emitted was 𝑵𝒆𝒎 = 𝟐 × 𝟏𝟎
𝟖
. b. 
Error rate v.s. transmission distance. The solid curve denotes the bit error rate predicted by the numerical simulation 
with 𝒆𝒔 = 𝟐. 𝟐%, where 𝒆𝒔 is the average probability that a signal hit the wrong detector. c. The average photon 
 
number (per pulse) v.s. transmission distance. The solid curve denotes the optimal values calculated using the 
numerical simulation. According to these values, the experimental average photon numbers (per pulse) were 0.06 at 
20 km, 0.05 at 50 km, 0.045 at 70 km, and 0.04 at 80, 85 and 90 km. It is clear that the secret key bits can be 
distributed over a 90-km transmission distance.
To summarize, we have successfully demonstrated an implementation of the RRDPS 
QKD protocol. As far as we know, this demonstration is the first active QKD experiment 
that did not require monitoring of the signal disturbance. Our achievement demonstrates that 
this novel protocol is feasible under practical conditions. The security and performance of 
the RRDPS protocol depend on the number of pulses L of each packet. In our 
implementation, L=65 is sufficiently large to demonstrate the potential advantages of this 
protocol. Although it seems to be a great challenge, four feasible schemes of the variable 
interferometer were developed to meet the requirement of large delay numbers. In addition 
to good stability, our implemented scheme exhibits very high scalability. Specifically, our 
variable-delay interferometer can be easily extended from 64 to 1024 bits, but the increase 
in the IL of the interferometer is only approximately 2.4 dB. A larger L will increase the key 
rate per packet and improve the bit error rate tolerance and channel loss. However, several 
issues must be addressed before realization of RRDPS QKD with larger L values. First, the 
stability of interferometer may be a challenge when L is very large because the phase would 
shift substantially, even if the environmental temperature changes little. To overcome this 
problem, finer active temperature control may be indispensable. Second, if L becomes larger, 
then the key rate per second may be decreased because more time would be spent to encode 
and detect each packet. To alleviate these effects and improve the performance of the 
RRDPS QKD, the repetition rate of a system with larger L must be increased. Despite these 
challenges, an RRDPS QKD system with large L and high repetition rate promises to be 
realized in the near future.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Methods 
Schemes of the variable-delay interferometer The variable-delay interferometer is the core part of Bob’s 
setup. We propose four typical schemes to implement the variable-delay interferometer. Taking the 1-64-bit 
variable-delay interferometer as an example, three schemes are shown in Fig. 4. The passive scheme is 
based on a 1 × 64 BS, followed by 64 FMIs (see Fig. 4a), of which the delays are {1,2,…,64}. Each 
interferometer uses one PZT cylinder to achieve better precision and compensate for the phase shift. All of 
the 64 interferometers are completely independent. The passive scheme has the advantage of high speed but 
requires too many SPDs. Fig. 4b and Fig. 4c show two active schemes based on the Mach-Zehnder 
interferometer structure. The simple scheme shown in Fig. 4b uses a 2 × 2 OS with 𝑙𝑜𝑔2(𝐿 − 1) separate 
delays, and the balanced scheme shown in Fig. 4c uses a 1 × 𝑁 OS with 2𝑁 = 2√(𝐿 − 1) separate delays. 
The basic unit in Fig. 4b is composed of a 2 × 2 OS and a PZT cylinder wrapped by an optical fiber with 
delay x. If the 2 × 2 OS is in the bar state, then the basic unit has delay 0; if the 2 × 2 OS is in the cross 
state, then the basic unit has delay x. There are three basic units in the short arm, with delays of 20 = 1, 
21 = 2, and 22 = 4. In the long arm, there are three basic units, with delays 23 = 8, 24 = 16, and 25 = 32, 
and one PZT cylinder with delay 23 = 8. By controlling the states of the basic unit, we can obtain delays of 
{0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7} in the short arm and delays of {8,16,24,32,40,48,56,64} in the long arm. Using this 
scheme, we only need to prepare 𝑙𝑜𝑔2 64 = 6 types of sperate delays. However, the IL of the basic unit in 
the cross state is approximately twice the IL in the bar state. Therefore, the losses of the long arm and the 
short arm become unbalanced, e.g., for the variable-delay interferometer with delay 64, all of three basic 
units of the long arm are in the cross state, with 0.8 × 2 × 3 = 4.8 dB, whereas all of three units of the 
short arm are in the bar state, with 0.8 × 3 = 2.4 dB, where 0.8 dB is the typical insertion loss of a 2 × 2 
OS. This imbalance between the long and short arms makes the visibility of the variable-delay 
interferometer very poor for some delays. Fig. 4c is a balanced scheme to implement the variable-delay 
interferometer. In the short arm, {0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7} delays lie between two 1 × 8 OSs, and in the long arm, 
{8,16,24,32,40,48,56,64} delays are also located between two 1 × 8  OSs. To obtain a more stable 
interference effect, these two active schemes can also be implemented based on the FMI. However, the IL 
of the variable interferometers will increase, and the simple scheme in Fig. 4b will become more 
unbalanced. Based on the FMI, the final experimental scheme we chose is balanced and stable, but the IL is 
almost the same as that of the balanced active scheme shown in Fig. 4c.  
  
 
FIG. 4. Three schemes for the variable-delay interferometer. a. Passive scheme based on a 1 × 64 BS. b. Simple 
active scheme based on  2 × 2 OSs. c. Balanced active scheme based on  1 × 8 OSs. 
 
Performance estimate for the QKD system To estimate the performance of our RRDPS QKD system and 
determine the optimal average photon number to be set, we used a numerical simulation based on 
parameters of the system. In the asymptotic case, the yield for an 𝑖-photon packet detected with an r-pulse 
delay interferometer is approximately  
𝑌𝑟,𝑖 =
𝐿 − 𝑟
𝐿
(1 − (1 − 𝜂)𝑖 + 𝑑), 
where 𝜂 = 𝜂𝐷10
−(𝛼𝑙+𝛼𝐼𝐿)/10, 𝜂𝐷 is the detection efficiency of the SPD, 𝛼 and 𝑙 are the loss coefficient and 
the length of the fiber channel, respectively, 𝛼𝐼𝐿 is the IL of the variable interferometer, and 𝑑 is the total 
dark count rate of the two channels of the SPD. The average yield for an 𝑖 -photon packet is given by  
 Y𝑖 = ∑
𝑌𝑟,𝑖
𝐿 − 1
L−1
𝑟=1
=
1
2
(1 − (1 − 𝜂)𝑖 + 𝑑). 
Then, considering each packet is a train of coherent pulses with the average photon number of μ, we can 
give the average yield of each packet as 
𝑄 = ∑ e−𝐿𝜇
∞
𝑖=0
(𝐿𝜇)𝑖
𝑖!
𝑌𝑖 =
1
2
(1 − 𝑒−𝜂𝐿𝜇 + 𝑑). 
And the bit error rate e𝑏 is  
𝑒𝑏 =
𝑒𝑠(1−𝑒
−𝜂𝜇)+𝑑/2
1−𝑒−𝜂𝜇+𝑑
, 
in which e𝑠 is the average probability that a signal hit the wrong detector. With Q and e𝑏, we are able to 
calculate the secret key rate R using Eq. (3). Thus, the optimal μ can be determined in a straightforward 
manner, and the corresponding Q, e𝑏, and R are determined through numerical methods. To maximize the 
secret key rate of our implementation, the parameters we used are as follows: the loss coefficient 𝛼 =
0.2𝑑𝐵/𝑘𝑚, the average IL of the 1-GHz, 1-64-bit variable-delay interferometer 𝛼𝐼𝐿 is 5.60 dB, the average 
detection efficiency 𝜂𝐷 and total dark count rate d of the two channels of the SPD are 20.3% and 2.1 ×
10−6, respectively, the error rate 𝑒𝑠 is 2.20%, and the efficiency of error correction f is 1.1.  
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